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Governing knowledge work: transactional and transformational
solutions
Abstract
The literature on organization design is dominated by ideas and theories on how to manage manual
work. This understanding is driven by a division of labor based on clear-cut responsibilities and by
focusing on hierarchical organization structures like the U-form, M-form, and matrix. Governance
mechanisms, for the most part, have been focused on transactional solutions, that is, on the monitoring
of work behavior and monetary rewards. Today, knowledge workers dominate the workforce, and the
integration of distributed, cross-functional knowledge is crucial. The most important governance
mechanisms are no longer based on transactional but rather on transformational solutions that focus on
the intrinsic motivation of knowledge workers and their willingness to collaborate. We provide
theoretical insight into the collaborative process and discuss three evolving organizational designs that
enable knowledge workers to collaborate.
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Peter Drucker stated that nowadays less than one fifth of the workforce are blue-collar 
workers doing manual work, while white-collar workers doing knowledge work make up the 
majority of the workforce. Yet when it comes to our understanding of a knowledge worker’s 
productivity, we are, today, roughly where we were in the year 1900 in terms of productivity 
of the manual worker. Organization design of knowledge work is still shaped to a large extent 
by ideas on how to manage manual work. In this article, we will explore the main differences 
between manual work and knowledge work in order to gain new insights on how to enhance 
the productivity of knowledge workers as dramatically as in the case with manual workers 
over the last century.  
We will argue that in the case of manual work, organizational design was mainly driven by 
division of labor, focusing on organizational structures like the U-form and the M-form. 
Integrating governance mechanisms played a secondary role. Further, governance 
mechanisms were focused on transactional solutions, that is, on monitoring and monetary 
rewards. In contrast, in the case of knowledge work integration of distributed cross-functional 
knowledge is crucial. Therefore, organization design has to start with integrating governance 
mechanisms while organization structure follows. The most important integrating governance 
mechanisms are no longer based on transactional but on transformational solutions that focus 
on the willingness and motivation of knowledge workers to cooperate voluntarily. Thus the 
new principles of organization design that meet the challenges of efficient knowledge work 
aim at community-based collaboration. We will analyze the theoretical insights on which such 
collaboration can be based and discuss three evolving organizational designs in order to 
demonstrate the implementation of these insights.  
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANUAL AND KNOWLEDGE WORK 
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What are the main differences between manual and knowledge work? Basically, all work 
inside firms is teamwork. Together, team members can produce a higher output than the sum 
of the separate outputs of each team member working independently. This is just as true for 
manual workers jointly lifting cargo into a truck as it is for knowledge workers jointly 
designing a new software product. A team or a firm thus creates what is commonly known as 
synergy. The more effort exerted by one person, the more productive other members of the 
team become.  
At the same time, creating synergies constitute what is called a social dilemma. It 
characterizes situations in which the actions of rational and self-interested individuals lead to 
situations of collective irrationality in which everyone is worse off. This is often the case in 
teams since it is hard to determine what input each of the team members has contributed to the 
joint output. Some team members may free ride at the cost of others. Thus the purpose of the 
team – to produce more than the sum of what members could produce individually – may not 
be achieved. Synergies may not be created. This is the reason why solving social dilemmas is 
at the heart of management in firms. 
In manual work, the traditional way of solving social dilemmas was to give a supervisor the 
right to punish shirking. This is exactly what Frederick Taylor preached. Managers could 
supervise workers and assess their individual productivity efficiently. A strictly horizontal and 
vertical division of labor made supervision work. Since this prevents information asymmetry 
between the managers and the workers, it enabled managers to control inputs and to measure 
outputs of employees, and to reward them accordingly. Therefore, in the case of manual work, 
organization design starts with determining clear-cut tasks and responsibilities. The dominant 
organizational form in this case is the U-Form, which uses a centrally coordinated, vertically 
integrated structure to manage and supervise employees in their highly specialized jobs. 
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However, in the case of knowledge work, this traditional solution to social dilemmas does not 
work for three reasons.  
First, to exploit knowledge of joint team production efficiently, the team members should to a 
high degree have different knowledge areas. Compare a team of workers lifting cargo into a 
truck with a team of fashion designers. Workers lifting cargo must not have different 
knowledge. In contrast, fashion designers need to integrate different knowledge about e.g. 
production processes, the garment, CAD software and marketing. In knowledge working 
teams who exploit their existing knowledge, it is not efficient if all team members know 
everything the others know. If the team leader knows everything her subordinates know, then 
synergies in exploiting knowledge will not be reached. Gains from specialization can only be 
reaped when cross learning is minimized and is replaced by knowledge of how to coordinate 
cross-functional knowledge. However, division of labor in knowledge work not only increases 
information asymmetries but also decreases the possibilities to monitor team members. The 
team-leader can monitor only to a limited extent whether her subordinates have chosen the 
most productive activities or whether they freeride. Although she could benchmark the team’s 
output if the outputs are measurable, she cannot attribute the joint result to singular team-
members. Even co-workers in a cross functional team of knowledge workers can control each 
other only to a certain degree, since they have different knowledge areas. As a result, if 
workers in a knowledge working team want to freeride, they are in a good position to avoid 
monitoring by their superiors and co-workers.  
Second, if joint knowledge-producing teams do not only exploit existing knowledge, but 
explore new knowledge, then knowledge transfer is crucial. Under these conditions, another 
problem arises. Contributions to firm specific joint knowledge are contributions to a firm 
specific common good, which each firm member can use, even if he has not contributed to it. 
For a rational and self-interested team-member there are two reasons to freeride instead of 
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contributing his knowledge. Firstly, he could lose his competitive edge. Secondly, he enables 
his supervisor to monitor him more effectively. As a result, selfish knowledge workers in 
teams are not only in a good position to freeride, but they also have an incentive to hide their 
expertise vis-à-vis their superiors and colleagues. 
Third, knowledge workers have much more bargaining power vis-à-vis managers than manual 
workers. They cannot be easily replaced. Consider the example of the team of workers lifting 
cargo into a truck. These workers can be trained quickly. In contrast, knowledge workers are a 
critical resource to the firm, because their abilities must contain firm specific knowledge to 
gain a sustainable competitive advantage. A knowledge worker may invest mainly in his 
general knowledge and underinvest in his firm specific knowledge without the employer 
being able to control this underinvestment sufficiently.  
 
TRANSACTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL DILEMMAS  
With knowledge work monitoring does not work to overcome social dilemmas as long as 
people act as rational egoists. This is due to information asymmetries between supervisors, 
workers and co-workers. Are there any alternative transactional solutions which provide 
incentives to self interested team-members not to freeride? Conventional wisdom suggests 
two solutions, both based on pay for performance for observable outputs. 
A first suggestion consists in the modularization of knowledge. The modules could be 
developed relatively independently by specialists and still be composed to a whole in an M-
form structure. Modularization reduces the need for knowledge transfer between specialists. 
Inside the module, specialists can work without having to acquire the knowledge of specialists 
working in other modules. A module can be organized like a profit center. Its output can be 
evaluated and linked to other modules via transfer prices. This solution works as long as the 
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product architecture is stable and the interfaces between the modules are clear-cut. As soon as 
this is not the case, transfer of specialist knowledge between the modules is necessary and the 
social dilemma arises again.  
Second, “selective incentives” are suggested to provide an incentive to transfer knowledge, 
e.g. when contributions to an electronic database are rewarded which then can be used by all 
firm members. A “selective incentive” is a bonus given to individuals as an inducement to 
contribute to a common good. However, such a bonus might work too well. Knowledge work 
contains some easy to measure components (e.g. pages of written text) and some hard to 
measure components (e.g. the importance of a text). Since pay-for-performance systems have 
to concentrate on few clear-cut criteria, they direct employees' attention towards these criteria. 
As a consequence, rational employees will focus on the easily measurable components of the 
task and leave aside the components that are not so easy to measure, but are often of higher 
importance. Such a goal displacement - often called multiple-task-effect - sometimes has 
dramatic unintended consequences on firm specific common goods. The example of Sears car 
repair shops show this with firm reputation. Mechanics working for this company were paid 
according to the profits earned on repairs requested by customers. With this incentive in mind, 
the mechanics talked customers - with some success - into commissioning unnecessary 
repairs. When these acts of dishonesty were exposed, the Californian authorities threatened to 
close down all Sears car repair shops in the state.  
To summarize, transactional solutions may mitigate some problems of joint knowledge work. 
But the more complex and dispersed among employees knowledge is, the more likely these 
solutions are to fail. 
 
TRANSFORMATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL DILEMMAS  
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We have demonstrated that knowledge work within and between teams cannot be monitored 
and sanctioned by supervisors in the same way as it is the case with manual work. Therefore, 
with selfish employees, social dilemmas unfortunately go hand in hand with the production of 
synergies and common goods that are supposed to increase with teamwork.  
Fortunately, “in most organizations, employees contribute much more to goal achievement 
than the minimum that could be extracted from them by supervisory enforcement...” as 
Herbert A. Simon has stated. To make use of this insight, we have to extend the theoretical 
background of the traditional view. According to the man model of “homo oeconomicus”, the 
traditional view assumes that people (a) have stable preferences and (b) that these preferences 
are selfish. In contrast, according to the man model of “homo psychologicus” which has been 
adopted by psychological economics, we take into account that (a) preferences can be 
transformed since they are plastic and (b) preferences are not only selfish ones. In contrast to 
the “homo oeconomicus” the “homo psychologicus” is not only based on assumptions, but on 
empirical research. On the basis of these insights, one might ask, under which conditions 
preferences of individuals can be shaped in a way that social dilemmas are avoided and 
contributions to common goods are fostered. This makes it clear that motivation is a main 
factor in knowledge team work. To study which transformational solutions could work, two 
types of motivation are to be distinguished: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  
Extrinsic motivation serves to satisfy indirect or instrumental needs, for example, money or 
reputation. As such, money is almost always the means to an end – for example, paying for a 
vacation, or buying a car – and not an end in itself. In this instance, a job is simply a tool with 
which to satisfy one´s needs with the salary one earns. Transactional solutions focus mainly 
on extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation works through immediate need satisfaction. An 
activity is valued for its own sake and is undertaken without any reward except the activity 
itself. There are two kinds of intrinsic motivation: enjoyment based motivation and prosocial 
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motivation. Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation refers to a satisfying flow of activity. 
Examples are skiing, playing a game, or solving an interesting puzzle. In each case, pleasure 
is derived from the activity itself and not by the compensation. Prosocial intrinsic motivation 
takes the wellbeing of others into account without expecting a reward. The welfare of the 
community enters into the preferences of the individuals. A wealth of empirical evidence 
demonstrates that many people, in fact, are prepared to contribute to the common good of 
their company and community. They feel better if they have observed group norms like 
ethical standards, professional codes of practice, or norms of fairness.  
 
HOW TO TRANSFORM MOTIVATION 
If employees are motivated intrinsically to collaborate, then shirking is not a preferable action, 
because the activity causes a benefit instead of a cost. The social dilemma disappears. 
Transactional solutions are no longer the only way to create synergies. Instead, solutions to 
transform motivations in a way that foster voluntary cooperation come into consideration. 
Transformational solutions focus on two directions: First, they aim to protect existing intrinsic 
motivation. Second, they intend to enlarge intrinsic motivation.  
 
Crowding-Out of Intrinsic Motivation 
Research by the psychologists Deci, Ryan and their associates show that under certain 
conditions, external interventions can reduce intrinsic motivation for an activity. A first 
condition for crowding-out to occur is that the individuals concerned have intrinsic motivation 
in the first place, which can then be undermined. Second, the crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivation occurs if people perceive an external intervention as reducing their self-
determination when doing an intrinsically interesting activity. In this case, people feel that 
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they are not the origins of their behavior. Their attention shifts from the activity itself to the 
external circumstances. The content of the activity loses its importance. 
The crowding-out effect has been observed for some forms of hierarchical control and reward 
systems. It has proved relevant for both types of intrinsic motivation, that is, for enjoyment-
based intrinsic motivation, as well as for pro-social motivation. In addition, it has also been 
observed that prosocial intrinsic motivation is crowded out if people realize that other team 
members are shirking. 
Crowding-out by Hierarchical Control. Hierarchical control, that is, the process of standard 
setting, monitoring and evaluation undermines intrinsic motivation if employees perceive 
control predominantly as a signal of distrust and as autonomy thwarting, and if they perceive 
control as selfish. The downside of a distrust-signaling hierarchical control system is vividly 
illustrated by Gittell’s research on American Airlines. The then-CEO Robert Crandall insisted 
that delays come to his attention and get assigned to individuals and departments. “Crandall 
wants to see the corpse” a field manager told. American Airlines control system was 
characterized by sanctioning “the culprit”. The result was a culture of fear and infighting. 
Individuals and units tried to pin the blame for problems on others instead of learning from 
their failures.  
Crowding-out by Reward Systems. Rewards are shown to also have an undermining effect 
on intrinsic motivation if they are perceived as controlling. A number of meta-analyses show 
that expected, tangible and salient performance-contingent rewards undermine individuals' 
intrinsic interest in an activity and their pro-social care for others. The effects of pay-for-
performance on intrinsic motivation are well illustrated in a famous field experiment by 
Gneezy and Rustichini, that analyzes the behavior of school children voluntarily collecting 
money for cancer research. The children reduced their efforts by about 36 percent when they 
were promised a bonus of one percent of the money collected. Their pro-social commitment 
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for the good cause was changed into a transactional money-for-deed attitude, while the one 
percent bonus was far too low to compensate for the loss of intrinsic motivation.  
Crowding-out by Freeriding of Others. If free-riding can take place without the possibility 
to sanction it, pro-social motivation to cooperate in teams is undermined in the long run. In 
other words, nobody is willing to be the "sucker" recurrently. If other team members are 
constantly shirking, the willingness to cooperate drops for everybody in the team. This effect 
has been studied by psychological economics in laboratory experiments. In so-called public 
good games that mimic social dilemmas, a high number of participants contribute voluntarily 
in the first round to the common pool. When the participants realize that others are shirking, 
they reduce their contribution, until after several rounds, it is close to zero.  
 
Crowding-In of Intrinsic Motivation  
Under certain conditions, external interventions have a positive impact on intrinsic motivation 
if they are a) targeted to create an intrinsically rewarding job environment, b) support 
employees’ feelings of competence by supporting forms of hierarchical control and rewards, 
c) support employees´ perception of esteem and relatedness by fair processes, d) signal social 
norms and e) enable self-governance in teams to discipline freeriders. 
Crowding-In by Job Design by Emphasizing Autonomy and Feedback. Intrinsic 
motivation can be enhanced through job design along several dimensions. The two most 
important dimensions are autonomy and task feedback. Autonomy, that is the degree to which 
the job provides decision latitude, enhances employees' self-determination and thereby 
strengthens intrinsic interest and pride in the job. Task feedback, that is the degree to which 
the job provides clear information about performance levels, heightens feelings of 
competence and empowers employees' in their tasks. Three additional dimensions were found 
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to strengthen intrinsic motivation through raising perceived meaningfulness of the job. These 
are variety (the degree to which a job requires the use of a number of different skills and 
talents); identity (the degree to which the job requires completion of a “whole” piece of work, 
or doing a task from beginning to end with a visible outcome) and significance (the degree to 
which the job offers opportunities to protect and promote the well-being of beneficiaries).  
Crowding-In by Hierarchical Control. Whereas hierarchical control often undermines 
intrinsic motivation, there are two conditions under which the contrary is true. First, empirical 
research demonstrates that hierarchical control is perceived as supportive if feedback is given 
in a constructive and timely way, and if caring guidance prevails. Second, hierarchical control 
that is executed for the sake of the community rather than for selfish interest is perceived to be 
legitimated. Field research shows that such benevolent, non-selfish monitoring leads to 
perceptions of organizational support and to higher pro-social motivation. Laboratory research 
demonstrates that people are more willing to contribute to a public good if a leader makes 
personal sacrifices.  
Crowding-In by Reward Systems. Some forms of reward systems also crowd-in intrinsic 
motivation. This is the case if these incentives support employee´s feelings of competence and 
esteem. Monetary incentives, for example, signal benevolence and caring attitude if they are 
presented as "no strings attached". A Norwegian study in a knowledge-intensive industry 
found that that a generous fixed wage has strong and positive effect on work performance 
through its boosting influence on intrinsic motivation and affective commitment. Such wages 
signal that the firm believes in employees' goodwill and efforts without the need of constant 
evaluation and control. Awards and non-monetary incentives also signal support and esteem 
for employees' voluntary special efforts. Awards thus play an important role in sectors where 
such voluntary efforts and intrinsic motivation are crucial, in academia, for example, in the 
arts, and in military and public services.  
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Crowding-In by Fair Processes. To boost intrinsic motivation governance mechanisms need 
to be designed and executed in a fair way. The characteristics of governance mechanisms that 
lead to perceived procedural fairness can be summarized as participation, neutrality, and 
being treated with dignity and respect. Participation gives employees voice to choose between 
alternatives. Even more important is the participation in devising the rules of cooperation. 
Neutrality refers to the extent to which employees feel that the company or their superiors 
make unbiased decision. A precondition is the belief that individuals who set and sanction the 
rules do not allow personal advantages to enter into their decision-making. Finally, 
governance mechanisms should be executed in a way that signals dignity and respect to 
employees. Note that all three characteristics of procedural fairness (participation, neutrality 
and being treated with dignity and respect) are essentially unrelated to outcomes. Therefore, 
procedural fairness is crucial for situations that may lead to unfortunate results for the 
employees, e.g. in resolving conflicts or making decisions concerning promotions. 
Crowding-In by Setting Pro-Social Standards. People seem to be inclined to do what they 
are asked to do. Field research has shown that people adhere to rules and accept the decisions 
of authorities they believe to be legitimate, even if it is not in their own self-interest to do so. 
People are also highly sensitive to signals about socially appropriate behavior. Such signals 
are given, e.g. by framing teamwork as a contribution to a community, instead of a 
tournament. In experiments it was found that participants were much more willing to 
contribute to a common good if they were told that they take part in a "community 
experiment" rather than in a "Wall Street experiment".  
Crowding-In by Self-Governance to Discipline Freeriders. In all kinds of communities 
there exist some freeriders. As mentioned, the willingness to contribute to the common good 
in a team declines drastically when contributors realize that others are shirking. However, 
when freeriders can be punished, contributions are raised to the initial level, but only when 
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punishment does not serve the self-interest of the punishers. As a consequence, self-
governance and peer-control in teams, as opposed to control by the superiors, is crucial for 
two reasons. First, sanctions by superiors are, in many cases, not considered as unselfish. 
Second, team members often are in a better position than superiors to realize shirking of 
peers. Elinor Ostrom, the Nobel prize–winner in economics 2009, has empirically shown with 
many examples that self-governance of commons is more efficient than hierarchical control 
with regard to counteraction of shirking. 
In sum, a context which prevents crowding-out and enables crowding-in strengthens intrinsic 
motivation, prosocial behavior and cooperative learning. An intrinsically motivating 
organizational environment reduces freeriding and thus is instrumental in helping to overcome 
the social dilemma of knowledge management. 
Table 1 summarizes the main differences between transactional and transformational 
solutions to social dilemmas as they are applied to manual and knowledge work. This table 
shows also what is discussed in the following section, namely, what follows from these 
theoretical insights. Firstly, we will introduce three new organizational forms to demonstrate 
how to implement transformational instead of transactional solutions. Secondly, we will show 
that the starting point for the governance of knowledge work is no longer the division of 
labor, but the integration of knowledge.  
 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
To raise the productivity of knowledge work, organizational designs must provide a basis for 
transformational solutions that foster knowledge workers’ intrinsic motivation to cooperate 
and share knowledge voluntarily. The starting point is no longer the strict division of labor 
and clear-cut responsibilities within discrete structural alternatives, like the U-form or the M-
form. We have to abandon a design process that starts with organization charts i.e. grouping 
of people into boxes and then connecting these boxes by some lines which symbolize 
coordinating and monitoring relationships. Instead, with the new organization forms, the 
starting point of organization design is the integration of knowledge by governance 
mechanisms that include a comprehensive bundle of relationships, ranging from democratic 
self-governance and participation to hierarchical coordination. Metaphorically speaking, the 
new organization design starts with the lines between the boxes, determines the meaning of 
the lines according to the requirements of knowledge integration and then considers the 
content of the boxes. If design solutions are tailored in this way, the focus of analysis shifts to 
attaining a new understanding of organizing; namely, from the dominance of organization 
structures to the dominance of integrating mechanisms, and from transactional solutions to 
transformational solutions that foster intrinsic motivation to collaborate voluntarily.  
In recent years, some new organizational forms have emerged that elucidate these ideas in an 
exemplary way. Although, they differ in various aspects, one common feature is evident: 
They emphasize collaboration and voluntary knowledge transfer across functional, divisional 
and even firm boundaries. Thus, happily, they provide us with ideas how transformational 
solution can be enabled and institutionalized in structures, processes and integrating 
mechanisms to govern knowledge work. We refer to three innovative organization design 
models that have evolved quite recently as the C-form, the F-form and the I-form. They are 
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exemplary organizational forms for governing knowledge work compared to traditional 
manual work. 
 
The Circular Organizational Form (C-Form) 
The concept of circularity was introduced in the 1980ies and advanced to an organization 
form by the management researcher Georges Romme. Circular design addresses 
organizational democracy by establishing the circularity of power: Hierarchy is preserved, but 
embedded in operating procedures based on consensus. Thus, the C-form is geared to 
transcending the origin dichotomy between two forms of control: hierarchical control and 
self-control. Many researchers see the two forms as inconsistent and incompatible. Therefore, 
it is little wonder that the circular design model did not become famous until detailed studies 
were conducted at the Dutch electrical company Endenburg. This company produces circuit 
boards and electrical control systems. To date, principles of circular design have been 
implemented worldwide in more than 30 firms.  
The key principle of circular design is the synthesis of hierarchical and self organizing forms 
of control. The organization switches continuously to and fro, in a timely and efficient 
manner, between authoritative and participative based mechanisms. This is done by 
establishing four design principles:  
First, decision making processes on strategy issues run according to the principle of 
consensus; the matter is debated in circles of organization members. Consensus is deemed to 
exist, if nobody raises a reasoned and overriding objective against the proposed decision.  
Second, each firm member participates in at least one circle. A circle is a decision-making 
unit, composed of people with a common work objective. “Circle-relevant” matters are 
decided by a participative process in which a consensus must be reached. The circle members, 
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in conjunction with their leaders, are autonomously responsible for smooth running of the 
cooperation and performance within their circle. The circle members are more likely to 
cooperate and are more willing to share knowledge, for two reasons. On the one hand, 
participation allows interactions among knowledge workers in the firm that are frequent and 
long-lasting. This enlarges the feeling to belong to a community. On the other hand, the 
participants of the process can be easily identified and thus peer control becomes a barrier 
against freeriding.  
Third, between two circles there are vertical connections that are formed by way of double 
linking. Double linking is the participation of at least two leaders in the next higher circle. 
One leader is appointed top down. He or she represents the traditional hierarchical principle. 
The other leader is elected by the members of the subordinate unit. He or she represents a 
democratic bottom up principle. This principle makes sure that hierarchical control is 
balanced by participation. A crowding-out effect by unilateral commands and unsupportive 
monitoring can be avoided. 
When there are different interests at hand, the fourth design principle is implemented: All co-
determining parties in the decision-making process clearly formulate their arguments and 
participate in a discourse until presumably, a stalemate occurs. If a new argument that will 
reach an agreement cannot be put forward within 48 hours, the matter to be agreed upon is 
passed to the next circle above and the debate is moderated by a representative of the higher 
circle. The idea behind this is to stop resistances impeding business activities. The 
experiences at Endenburg show that in most cases an acceptable solution for all sides is 
reached before the 48 hours are up, because the negotiating parties have an interest in 
preventing intervention by the next instance up in the hierarchy. Elaborated intranet solutions 
were realized to support these decision making processes, so that all representatives have free 
access to decision-relevant information.  
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The circular design model is well suited to foster intrinsic motivation of firm members. This 
is because the four design principles are characterized by a high degree of autonomy and 
participation, task feedback, fair procedures, and self governance through peer control. 
Firstly, the circular form allows firm members to influence decisions whose results will affect 
them. They regularly have the opportunity of raising their objections in various circle 
meetings. Secondly, the circular form gives clear information about expected performance 
levels and responsibilities as well as feedback on goal achievement. Thirdly, the rules of 
decision-making are fair. With a circular design, the rules of decision making are easily 
identified by every firm member, and each firm member can get involved. Finally the sucker-
effect is avoided because peer control is enabled.  
 
The Initiative-Freeing Organizational Form (F-Form) 
While the C-form links democratic bottom up organization with hierarchical top down 
organization, the F-forms goes a step further and intends to reduce hierarchical control to a 
minimum. The F-form was introduced by two management researchers, Brian Carney and 
Isaac Getz who are inspired by the work of the psychologists Deci, Ryan, and their associates. 
They studied companies like W.L. Gore & Associates, one of the leading manufacturers in 
polymer products, and the Danish Hearing Device Manufacturer Oticon. These companies 
were experimenting with organizational designs which emphasize self-initiative and 
autonomy. The key principle of such initiative freeing forms, which are shortly called the F-
form, is a design in which the firm members should have freedom and responsibility to take 
actions that they decide are best. Thus in many of those companies studied, employees are 
allowed to set their own work times, choose their own job descriptions, and create their own 
job descriptions. Some even have no traditional organization charts and no assigned formal 
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roles. The goal of the F-form organization is to create an environment where employees can 
motivate themselves. The F-form is characterized by three design principles. 
The first design principle is to institutionalize processes of participation. Employees are 
regularly asked where they want to contribute and are involved in the decision processes. For 
example in the case of W.L. Gore & Associates leaders are not formally designated but are 
peer selected. In addition each employee has chosen his or her personal mentor to make sure 
that his or her voice is heard across projects and functions. Mentors are also chosen to support 
fair reward systems.  
The second design principle is to provide integrating mechanisms that foster autonomy and 
intrinsic interest. For example at W.L. Gore & Associates employees are encouraged to 
experiment, collaborate and self-select into projects. This principle includes, for example, the 
authority to spend whatever time is required to solve a customer’s problem. This type of work 
design not only allows for maximal self-determination but at the same time also creates 
variety, identity and significance of work. Variety and identity is supported because 
employees are encouraged to switch between projects and functions. Significance is signaled 
by encouraging employees to change leadership and functional roles which provides them 
with a better understanding of the interdependence of team projects and thus of the 
contribution of their work to the company as a whole. 
The third design principle is to replace traditional command and control practices by means of 
participation, self-governance and peer control. Employees are expected to reach an 
agreement on the rules of cooperation, to set social norms, and to subject them to peer-
control. Work is structured in a way that what each employee does becomes visible and is 
contingent upon what others do. One principle of W.L. Gore & Associates is to stay small to 
enable these processes: whenever a unit exceeds 200 employees it is split into new units. This 
self-governance on the one hand has the potential to transform the originally divergent 
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preferences of employees into a common mutual understanding by promoting a group 
identity. On the other hand it helps to avoid the sucker-effect. Recurrently free-riding 
individuals are not likely to last long in such teams. 
Though the three design principles of the F-form are not yet as clearly developed as those of 
the C-form it has become obvious that the F-form implements the theoretical insights of how 
to foster intrinsic motivation to contribute to the common good via three areas: participation, 
autonomy-enhancing job design and self-governance through peers. 
 
The Innovation Organizational Form (I-Form) 
The I-form is a collaborative community of complementor firms. The management 
researchers Miles, Snow, Miles, and their colleagues suggest this design model as 
organizational answer to the innovation era. It evolves in industries where on the one hand the 
knowledge base on which business opportunities rest is constantly changing and growing. On 
the other hand, this knowledge is distributed among firms. The I-form organization follows 
the strategy of persistent exploration of new market uses for continuously adapted 
technologies. It is based on an entrepreneurial research and development process, because 
ideas developed in one setting are adapted to a new use in another setting. This happens when 
people from different firms interact collaboratively within networks or communities. Thus, 
the I-form transports key principles of governing knowledge and innovation work beyond 
traditional firm boundaries to multi-firm networks. 
The evolution of the I-form model is tracked in many pioneering communities such as 
Technical and Computing Graphics (TCG), a network of Australian firms which collaborate 
on technological and product innovation in the IT sector, as well as in web-based businesses. 
A very recent example is the Open Handset Alliance (OHA), a business alliance of 50 firms 
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founded at the end of 2007. This alliance is led by Google and includes companies like Intel, 
LG, Motorola, T-Mobile, Texas Instruments and many others. Google chairman and CEO 
Eric Schmidt said that the alliance’s vision is to advance open standards for mobile devices 
which will help shape a new computing environment in terms of how people access and share 
information in the future. The members of this community develop Android, a mobile 
operating system based on an open source license. Since its original release it has been 
updated many times and some members have contributed significant intellectual property to 
the Alliance. The first commercially available phone running Android went on to the market 
in autumn 2008. 
The key assets of these exemplary networks are knowledge commons that accumulate 
learning and serve as an idea bank which member firms can tap. To govern these knowledge 
commons, three design principles are applied: a facilitator organization, general operating 
protocols used to guide firm behavior, as well as voluntary and collective management of the 
commons. 
The first design principle reflects the facilitator organization which provides strategic 
initiatives and administrative services to the community. At the OHA, Google assumes the 
role of the facilitator and sets the strategic initiative by contributing its knowledge on mobile-
device code writing to unveil an open software platform. Applying administrative services to 
governance means that some control of the collaboration procedures is delegated to the 
facilitator organization. Such delegated control is likely to be perceived as organizational 
support and not as a signal of distrust.  
The second design principle is to transform supportive mission and value statements into 
general operating protocols. These protocols include the expectations of how individuals and 
the collaborating companies should behave in the community. They set standards guiding the 
inter-firm behavior. It is important that the protocols are visible. Thus ambiguity is reduced 
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and reliability is increased. In addition, protocols eliminate potential conflicts, because they 
are formulated for objectivity. Seen in this light, operating protocols also form the basis for 
transformational solutions. On the one hand, they foster fair processes because they are 
devised in a participative way and guarantee neutrality. On the other hand, operating protocols 
can be used to set pro-social standards by agreeing on a socially appropriate behavior. 
The third design principle reflects self-management to govern voluntarily the knowledge 
commons. For example, at the OHA potential co-determinants must apply for admission to 
the network. All members decide together which companies are welcome to join this 
collaborating community of vendors, carriers and application developers. All community 
members are expected to reach a consensus on the rules of cooperation. Another example is 
that at the OHA each collaborating party has undertaken an obligation to greater openness in 
the mobile ecosystem. The operating system Android only works because all members agreed 
to advance and use these knowledge commons as the platform for the products and services 
they will develop. All community members are also expected to subject each other to peer 
control to discipline freeriders. Self-management processes are implemented in order to firstly 
determine the content of the operating protocols, secondly to gain compliance with these 
protocols, thirdly to modify them over time so as to better fit them to changing characteristics 
of the community setting, and fourthly to decide on sanctions for those parties who violate the 
protocols.  
The three design principles of the I-form fit very well into the theoretical insights developed 
how to foster voluntary contributions to knowledge commons. Intrinsic motivation is 
enhanced by supportive coordination via the facilitator organization, by fair procedures, by 
establishing social standards via general operating protocols, and by self governance through 
peers. The I-form demonstrates that transformational solutions are not only applicable within 
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single organizations but also across multi-firm boundaries in order to enable collaborative 
communities.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the new organization design models discussed, the C-form, the F-form and the 
I-form, have two characteristics in common that differentiate them from the traditional U-
form and M-form. Both characteristics aim at fostering voluntary contribution to common 
goods or synergies, which are achieved through collaborative knowledge work.  
First, the starting point in the design process is no longer the division of labour into clear cut 
tasks and responsibilities and grouping them into boxes and charts. Instead, the starting point 
is the design of integrating mechanisms, such as processes of participation and self 
governance. Note that the design principles of the three new design models do not refer to any 
dimensions of division of labour, such as functional or market-related tasks. Instead, the 
circles in the C-form or the project groups in the F-form can contain different tasks, e.g. 
functional, regional- or project-based tasks. 
Second, the integrating mechanisms are no longer concentrated on transactional solutions to 
the problems of social dilemmas, such as monitoring and contingent pay. Instead, the 
integrating mechanisms center on transformational solutions to foster intrinsic motivation to 
collaborate. Thus the social dilemma is mitigated since activities to contribute to the common 
good are no longer a cost but a benefit. We have shown that the integration mechanisms in the 
C-, F-, and I-form fit very well into the theoretical insights with regard how to foster intrinsic 
motivation, in particular participation, autonomy-enhancing job designs, and peer control to 
avoid free-riding. 
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However, there are also differences between the three forms. They relate to the question how 
the coordination of activities between teams is achieved. In case of the C-form it is quite clear 
that hierarchical coordination is preserved, though embedded in the double linking of circles 
that enable at the same time authoritative and participative integration mechanisms. In the 
case of the I-form the facilitator organization exerts some hierarchical coordination, though in 
what way this coordination is executed seems to differ in the firms mentioned. In the case of 
the F-form it is quite unclear how coordination is achieved and whether this is done in a way 
that is perceived to be supporting. In general, more case study research is needed to inquire 
whether there is a robust repertoire of integrating mechanisms that allow coordination of 
activities between teams without hierarchical control undermining intrinsic motivation. 
Despite these open questions we hope to have contributed to the insight, that the design 
principles to organize knowledge work are different from those of earlier organizational 
forms. We have shown that to enhance productivity of knowledge work it is not sufficient to 
build on monitoring and contingent pay, that is, on the assumption of “homo oeconomicus”. 
Rather it is necessary to focus on the question how to govern commons on the basis of “homo 
psychologicus”. These insights should be based on theoretical and empirical work and be 
integrated into a theory of "new organizational forms". A good example of how this can be 
done in a systematic fashion is the work of Elinor Ostrom, who has won the 2009 Nobel-prize 
in economics for her theoretical and empirical insights on design principles of institutions to 
govern tangible commons. Thus let us follow her example and gain further insights into how 
to govern intangible knowledge commons in the new organizational forms for the 21th global 
economy.  
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TABLE 1 
 
 
Solutions to Social 
Dilemmas  
Transactional Transformational 
Main Area of Application 
 
Man Model 
Manual Work 
 
Homo Oeconomicus 
 
Knowledge Work 
 
Homo Psychologicus 
 
Main Governance 
Mechanisms 
Monitoring 
Contingent Pay 
Job Design that Fosters 
- Autonomy 
- Supportive Feedback 
- Fair Processes 
- Social Relatedness 
- Self Governance 
Starting Point for 
Organization Design  
Division of Labor First Integration of Knowledge 
First 
 
Exemplary Organizational 
Forms 
U-Form 
M-Form  
C-Form 
F- Form 
I-Form 
 
 
Table 1: Main differences between transactional and transformational solutions to social dilemmas 
with manual work and knowledge work. 
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SUMMARY 
Our understanding of organization design is still dominated by ideas on how to manage 
manual work. This understanding is mainly driven by the division of labor based on clear cut 
responsibilities, focusing on organizational structures like the U-form and the M-form. 
Integrating governance mechanisms played a secondary role and were focused on 
transactional solutions, that is, on monitoring and monetary rewards. Today knowledge work 
is dominating. In this case integration of distributed cross-functional knowledge is crucial. 
Therefore, organization design has to start with integrating governance mechanisms while 
clear cut responsibilities play a secondary role. The most important integrating governance 
mechanisms are no longer based on transactional but on transformational solutions that focus 
on the willingness and intrinsic motivation of knowledge workers to collaborate. We analyze 
the theoretical insights on which such collaboration can be based and discuss three evolving 
organizational designs in order to demonstrate the implementation of these insights.  
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